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The contributions of the student editors in this issue have been writtenv itde,
the supervision of individual inembers of the law faculty. Pliblication of signcd
contributions from any source does not signify adoption of the views expressed by
the LAW REVIEW or its editors collectively.
AN ANNOTATOR'S REFLECTIONS UPON THE
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
The North Carolina annotations' cover only 177 sections out of the
total of 609 embraced in the Restatement of Contracts. 2 They deal with
the chapters on meaning of terms, general principles, offer and accept-
ance, consideration, seals, joint contracts, third party beneficiaries, and
assignments. No annotations were prepared to 24 sections because of
their introductory and obvious character. On 44 sections, or substan-
tially one-third of those remaining, no North Carolina law could be
found. Because of confusion in the state law, it proved difficult to indi-
cate the relationship between that law and 7 sections. On 18 sections
the North Carolina law was squarely opposed to the Restatement. Sixty-
1 (1934) 13 N. C. L. Rav. 1.
2 St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers, 1932.
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two sections, or nearly half of those annotated, were more or less
affected by 49 separate statutes.
A word as to how these annotations were prepared. The work was
not limited to taking the proposition expressed in each section into the
current digests in order to ascertain whether or not the cases on that
specific proposition were in accord with the Restatement. Instead,3 all
of the state decisions and statutes dealing with any of the broad topics
of contract law designated by the Restatement's chapter headings, e.g.,
consideration, were distributed under the most relevant of the Restate-
ment sections. Some of the results were merely cumulative. There
were many other cases that could not even be tacked on to the Restate-
ment. The annotator arbitrarily brought into the picture a considerable
number of related factual and administrative decisions because they
clothe the skeleton of general principle with living interstitial tissue.
Thus one is enabled to see the contrast between the Restatement and the
local law as a whole.
The established North Carolina law of contracts will not be imme-
diately changed merely because it is opposed at some points by 18 sec-
tions of the Restatement. However, the 44 sections on which there is
no state law and the 7 in relation to which the local law is in confusion
should be constructively used as persuasive authority. Written over a
period of eight years by a small group of nationally recognized spe-
cialists in Contract 4 law, their drafts checked and revised by the Coun-
cil5 and by the full membership0 of the American Law Institute, the
'All cases cited in every digest in the history of the state were briefed. Profes-
sor A. C. McIntosh's CAsEs oN CoNTRAcTs (2nd ed., 1915, Cincinnati: W. H. An-
derson Co.), largely made up of North Carolina cases, proved invaluable. An effort
was made to locate every North Carolina decision in the Federal Reporters. All
local cases and statutes cited by the court in each opinion were briefed. Finally, all
of this was run through Shepard's Citator.
'The American Law Institute's Committee on Contracts: Samuel Williston,
Harvard University, Reporter; Arthur L. Corbin, Yale University, Special
Adviser, and Reporter for Chapter on Remedies; Merton L. Ferson, University of
Cincinnati; Dudley 0. McGovney, University of California; William H. Page,
University of Wisconsin; George J. Thompson, Cornell University; William E.
McCurdy, Harvard University, Legal Assistant; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Harvard
University, Adviser for Sections relating -to Specific Performance; Edgar N.
Durfee, University of Michigan, Adviser for Sections relating to Specific Per-
formance.
r The Council of the American Law Institute in 1932: George E. Alter, Pitts-
burgh, Pa.; Newton D. Baker, Cleveland, Ohio; Rousseau A. Burch, Topeka,
Kan.; James Byrne, New York City; Benjamin N. Cardozo, Washington, D. C.;
John W. Davis, New York City; Robert G. Dodge, Boston, Mass.; Frederick F.
Faville, Des Moines, Iowa; William I. Grubb, Birmingham, Alabama; William
Browne Hale, Chicago, Ill.; Learned Hand, New York City; William V. Hodges,
Denver, Colo.; Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Houston, Texas; Daniel N. Kirby, St.
Louis, Mo.; Monte M. Lemann, New Orleans, La.; Orrin K. McMurray, Berkeley,
California; William D. Mitchell, Washington, D. C.; Victor Morawetz, New
York City; George Welwood Murray, New York City; Emmett N. Parker,
Olympia, Washington; Thomas I. Parkinson, New York City; George Wharton
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Restatement occupies a position unique among law books. But will
the text, comments and illustrations, unsupported by an accompanying
analysis of the pertinent American cases, sound convincing to the prac-
ticing lawyer? Is the legal profession in this country trained to handle
a text somewhat in the nature of the continental codes? Or is the
American bench and bar too deeply imbued with the case-law system of
precedent? The suggestion is ventured that instead of encouraging the
writing of 48 separate local annotations, most of which will be too
sketchy and barren to be of assistance, the American Law Institute
might more profitably have sponsored the preparation by the authors of
the Restatement of a definitive accompanying treatise-commentary.
The Explanatory Notes, published at the back of the Official Draft (in
part) of 1928 were helpful but they did not go far enough. What is
needed is typified by the second edition of WILLISTON ON SALES7 and
the newly announced BEALE's CONFLICT OF LAWS.8 These treatises are
the work of the chief draftsmen of the Sales Act and of the RESTATE-
MENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, respectively.
But what of the sections on which the state law has been found in
accord? These number 84, a little less than half of the total of 177
under consideration and more than half of those annotated. Let us look
at Section 84 (d) and Sections 85-90. The first, adopting the minority
view in this country, removes the ban "that the party giving the con-
sideration is then bound by a contractual or quasi-contractual duty to a
third person to perform the act or forbearance given or promised as
consideration." The others utter the bold heresy that no consideration
is required for promises to pay debts barred by the statute of limitations,
debts barred by bankruptcy, promises to perform a duty in spite of non-
performance of a condition, promises to perform a voidable duty, and
promises reasonably inducing definite and substantial action in reliance.
Here is frank innovation in what might at first appear to be merely a
Pepper, Philadelphia, Pa.; Atlee Pomerene, Cleveland, Ohio; Owen J. Roberts,
Washington, D. C.; Elihu Root, New York City; Elihu Root, Jr., New York City;
Marvin B. Rosenberry, Madison, Wis.; Arthur P. Rugg, Worcester, Mass.; Henry
Upson Sims, Birmingham, Alabama; Edgar Bronson Tolman, Chicago, Ill.;
Arthur J. Tuttle, Detroit, Mich.; George W. Wheeler, Bridgeport, Conn.; George
W. Wickersham, New York City.
North Carolina members of the American Law Institute in 1935 are: Robert
L. Smith, Albemarle; W. M. Toomer, Asheville; M. T. Van Hecke, Chapel Hill;
John J. Parker, Charlotte; Charles W. Tillett, Jr., Charlotte; R. 0. Everett,
Durham; H. Claude Horack, Durham; Malcolm McDermott, Durham; Kenneth
C. Royall, Goldsboro; Robert Moseley, Greensboro; L. R. Varser, Lumberton;
Alexander B. Andrews, Raleigh; Willis Smith, Raleigh; W. P. Stacy, Raleigh;
Thomas W. Davis, Wilmington; George Rountree, Wilmington; William M.
Hendren, Winston-Salem; and H. G. Hudson, Winston-Salem.
7 New York: Baker-Voorhis, 1924.
s Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1935.
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Restatement of existing law. Yet the results of the North Carolina
cases, except for certain statutes, are substantially in accord with the
results contemplated by the Restatement. And the refreshing candor
of these new formulae is preferable to the artificial and clumsy efforts
of the courts to render lip service to the old doctrine of consideration
in these situations.
There are numerous instances in which the Restatement uses an
analysis, a technique and a phraseology for the most part unheard of
by many members of the bench and bar. Examples are in Sections 133,
150, 151, and 160, defining respectively the various types of third party
beneficiaries, effective assignments, and the delegation of performance
of a duty. However, the results of the local cases can be squeezed
-without too much mutilation into the categories set up by the Restate-
ment. And it is hoped that it will not take long for the nice discrimina-
tions of the Restatement to supplant the homely generalizations which
have heretofore been used 'by the lawyer and judge. Thus, should not
the distinctions between donee, creditor and incidental beneficiaries ulti-
mately render it unnecessary to cite Gorrell v. The Water Company9 as
the generic basis for everything in this field? The Restatement has
furnished a set of better fashioned tools.
Only in a few places does the Restatement betray an awareness of
the possibility that legislation might endanger its symmetry. It would
be a tacit misrepresentation, however, if one were permitted to infer
that all of the 49 statutes mentioned in the first paragraph have under-
mined the 62 sections of the Restatement affected. Rather, the relations
between Restatement and statutes fall into three main groups. Illustra-
tive of one is an Act of 1875 contradictory of the Restatement's concep-
tion of consideration in contracts to accept less than the amount due.
Illustrative of the second group are the statutes whkh add to the Re-
statement's requirements that of a writing for promises to pay debts
barred by the statute of limitations or by bankruptcy. And illustrative
of the third group is the statute giving laborers and materialmen a right
of action on bonds furnished by contractors erecting public works. In
each case, the Restatement drops from sight as the problem shifts fTom
the common law of contracts to the meaning of the statute.
The Act relating to agreements to accept less than the sum due in
satisfaction of the whole was faithfully applied by the courts for some
years after its passage as a legislative attempt to repeal a part of the
common law rule of consideration. But since 1915 the court has
assumed that the statute would not operate unless the claim were dis-
'See the N. C. Ann. to Section 133 (a) of the Restatement under the heading,
Water Company Cases (1934) 13 N. C. L. Rxv. 1, 96.
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puted. Two pages of annotations, appended to Section 76 (a), were
needed to trace the history of the construction of this statute. The
original purpose of the statute has been lost sight of. So, too, has the
fact that payment of less in case of a disputed claim was sufficient at
common law. Perhaps the statute was being used to facilitate sharp
practice in the cases of bills paid by check.
The situation respecting contractors' bonds is this: Laborers and
materialmen engaged upon public buildings have not been protected by
the mechanics' lien laws. Unfortunately, many of them went unpaid.
If bonds were required by the public authorities letting the contract,
they were often designed merely to save the municipality harmless, i.e.,
they were to indemnify the owners against loss and did not purport to
run to the benefit of laborers or materialmen. Occasionally the bond
was so conditioned. But, the laborers and materialmen not being repre-
sented at the bargaining table, this rarely happened. The result was that
in 1913 and 1915 statutes were enacted to require a contractors' bond
running to the benefit of these particular creditors on every municipal
building or street construction job. They were given a statutory right
of action on every such bond. The trouble was that the only sanction
or enforcement provision was one making it a misdemeanor for the
appropriate official to fail to obtain such a bond. And the court held
that if, in violation of the statute, the bond actually taken were one
merely of indemnity against loss 'by the municipality, the laborers and
materialmen were not entitled to sue thereon and could not hold the
municipal officers civilly responsible. Nor was this limitation of liabil-
ity void as contrary to the public policy expressed by the statute. In
1923, however, the statute was amended so as to make evasion impos-
sible. Under it a contractor's bond upon a municipal public works job
is conclusively presumed to have been given pursuant to the statute,
whether so drawn or not, and the statute is made a term of every bond.
Contrast the significance of the evolution of this statute with the pro-
vision of Section 133 of the Restatement, "where performance of a
promise in a contract will benefit a person other than the promisee, that
person is . . . a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift
appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances and performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or
supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary."
The Restatement of Contracts is not a statement nor even a cat-
alogne of the many different forces that are making contract law.' 0
"For other criticisms of the Restatement of Contracts see Clark, (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 643; Havighurst, (1933) 27 ILL. L. Rav. 910; Patterson, (1933) 33 CoL.
L. REv. 397; Pollock, (1933) 47 HAxv. L. REV. 363.
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It will not be of importance in the field of business strategy where con-
tracts are drafted amid the conflict of almost always unequal bargaining
powers. As a solving device for new cases on the advancing frontier -of
contract litigation, its cryptic postulates are too remote. Rather, the
important value of the Restatement, limited though that may be in an
experimental world, consists in its systematic clarification of conventional
legalistic categories. It is the anatomy of the established judge-made
law of contracts. Perhaps it will only preserve a body of elementary
rules already somewhat outmoded. Perhaps its proffer of a recon-
structed foundation of basic principle for the guidance of a bewildered
legal profession is but illusory. For that bewilderment may not be due
so much to the current welter of hasty, ill-considered and ad hoc opin-
ions and laws as to the incapacity of concepts such as those set forth
in the Restatement to provide a solution for the prevailing legal problems
of today. The Restatement will not enlarge the horizon of the legal
mind, but its use will equip that mind with a more accurate picture of
the doctrinal background.
M. T. VAN HECKE.
